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AAR13/5/2012, 113th Cavalry v 2.CSB
Feb 26, 2015 13:42:47 GMT -5
Post by Saunders[41stAIR] on Feb 26, 2015 13:42:47 GMT -5
SITUATION 13MAY2012
In combat against the 2 Czechoslovak Brigade on the map La Fueille, the 113th Cavalry Group met their enemy for a classic realism battle consisting of one round. The 2.CSB portrayed the Axis defenders.
1st Platoon, Troop C of the 113th Cavalry Squadron was tasked with securing the town of La Heugueville. The objective area encompassed two hamlets; referred to as La Grand Heugueville and La Petit Heugueville, the road that connected them and two small farms. The enemy were relatively well-equipped but devoid of Armored support - this they more than made up for with caches of hand-held explosives, panzerfausten and panzerschreck rockets. The terrain was generally considered better than average for tanking; the Norman Bocage in this area being relatively light and easily traversable mechanically, but having an adverse affect on visibility and greatly limiting the aid the one M4A1 tank sent in support could lend us. The enemy were noted to have used the Bocage to infiltrate men to our rear on several occasions.
REPORT OF ACTIONS
The planned assault had the Platoon marching one squad, mounted, with Tank support down the main road to engage the garrison of "La Petit" at distance, with two squads dismounted moving to either flank. Second squad, under Pfc. Saunders was given the tasks of (1) defending the armored support, (2) clearing the path ahead of the platoon and (3) occupying the village of "La Verderie" and engaging "La Petit" at distance with small arms fire. In the event of an opportunity presented, they were told to be ready to move swiftly down the main road to enter the objective area. Third Squad, the southern flank, was tasked with entering a small farm South of "La Petit." Tasked with clearing it out, they were then instructed to either carry on the attack into "La Petit" in conjunction with others, or if necessary hold firm and screen against any movements from "La Grand." First squad, the Northern flank, was to infiltrate dismounted through the fields and come down on the first objective from the bocage.
Upon capture of "La Petit", the squads were instructed to bring up their halftracks swiftly and cover the entrance of 2nd Squad and the armor support into the town. Thereafter a near-identical attack was to be mounted upon La Grand, with 1st utilizing armor support to take the noticeable high ground to the North-West flank of the objective.
For the most part the attack was carried out to plan for a relatively routine, if hard-fought success. At several points however, the tenacity of the enemy's defense disrupted our efforts and led to improvisation. They will be listed here-in.
The destruction of 1st squad could have been a disaster had the enemy not had to focus such firepower on them; weakening their cover of the main road. Between the embattled 3rd squad and the pinned 1st, the enemy could not bring sufficient fire power to bear to stop 2nd from simply entering the village under cover fire from our Armored support. Such improvisation is only possible due to the communications from First as to the nature of the enemy fire they received. When it became obvious to all that the pinned 1st squad had the majority of the enemy force to their front, it was acted upon swiftly. Regardless, the Northern approach route was clearly flawed, and shows a lack of situational awareness at the Platoon-level. The Platoon Commander is encouraged to move up with the rifle squads to reconnoiter the axis-of-attack personally in future operations.
The remaining enemy, upon the capture of La Petit, fell back under pressure from 3rd Squad to La Grand. They were swiftly cleared out in conjunction with the still-fresh 2nd Squad and the Platoon's Armored support. The last enemy pockets of resistance had to be eliminated by point-blank fire from the M4A1 Sherman. The mop-up of La Grand led to light losses in both squads.
For the cost of 2 wounded, and 7 killed, the Platoon seized its objectives and completely destroyed the enemy forces; forcing open the Verderie-Huegueville road.
Signed,
2nd Lieutenant Victor Rinaldi
C Troop, 113th Cav Sqdrn, 113th Cavalry Group
XIX Corps
In combat against the 2 Czechoslovak Brigade on the map La Fueille, the 113th Cavalry Group met their enemy for a classic realism battle consisting of one round. The 2.CSB portrayed the Axis defenders.
1st Platoon, Troop C of the 113th Cavalry Squadron was tasked with securing the town of La Heugueville. The objective area encompassed two hamlets; referred to as La Grand Heugueville and La Petit Heugueville, the road that connected them and two small farms. The enemy were relatively well-equipped but devoid of Armored support - this they more than made up for with caches of hand-held explosives, panzerfausten and panzerschreck rockets. The terrain was generally considered better than average for tanking; the Norman Bocage in this area being relatively light and easily traversable mechanically, but having an adverse affect on visibility and greatly limiting the aid the one M4A1 tank sent in support could lend us. The enemy were noted to have used the Bocage to infiltrate men to our rear on several occasions.
REPORT OF ACTIONS
The planned assault had the Platoon marching one squad, mounted, with Tank support down the main road to engage the garrison of "La Petit" at distance, with two squads dismounted moving to either flank. Second squad, under Pfc. Saunders was given the tasks of (1) defending the armored support, (2) clearing the path ahead of the platoon and (3) occupying the village of "La Verderie" and engaging "La Petit" at distance with small arms fire. In the event of an opportunity presented, they were told to be ready to move swiftly down the main road to enter the objective area. Third Squad, the southern flank, was tasked with entering a small farm South of "La Petit." Tasked with clearing it out, they were then instructed to either carry on the attack into "La Petit" in conjunction with others, or if necessary hold firm and screen against any movements from "La Grand." First squad, the Northern flank, was to infiltrate dismounted through the fields and come down on the first objective from the bocage.
Upon capture of "La Petit", the squads were instructed to bring up their halftracks swiftly and cover the entrance of 2nd Squad and the armor support into the town. Thereafter a near-identical attack was to be mounted upon La Grand, with 1st utilizing armor support to take the noticeable high ground to the North-West flank of the objective.
For the most part the attack was carried out to plan for a relatively routine, if hard-fought success. At several points however, the tenacity of the enemy's defense disrupted our efforts and led to improvisation. They will be listed here-in.
(1) Upon securing the Farm at co-ordinates "G3" against relatively light enemy presence, 3rd was almost immediately hit by a local counterattack by dismounted German infantry, roughly equal in size to them. The resulting firefight, lasting about twenty minutes led to a serious detriment in flank security. Prudently, the squad leader asked for Armored support to be deviated to their co-ordinates to aid in clearing out the attacking enemy, but a serious lack of situational awareness (credited to both the bocage terrain as well as tank-crew inexperience) led to the lost and dangerously exposed M4A1 to be recalled to its start-line by Platoon Command. Under their own power however, Third cleared out the enemy in a professional manner, no doubt losing many more men however as a result. Third was therein immobile and in no position to immediately aid in the attack on La Petit. It is suspected that their seizure of the farm drew out the garrison of La Grand however, giving us an advantage for the later stages of the operation.
(2) While trading fire with "La Petit", 2nd Squad reported small arms fire rattling off to the Platoon's rear. With both its sister squads already well on their way to their assigned objectives, it was quickly deduced that enemy infiltrators had managed to slip through to the Platoon's rear. The SL swiftly disengaged in their firefight with La Petit and split his squad into two elements; one to protect the Tank and its crew, the other to locate the exact enemy position. In any event, the enemy infiltrators were dealt with by the patrol with no losses being sustained. The enemy infiltrators were certainly more than a nuisance-effect, each man being armed with a panzerfaust and hand-held anti-tank weapon. If it had not been for the swift response from 2nd and the excellent situational awareness of 3rd (who helped 2nd zero in on the enemy audio), we could have suffered a devastating reverse from a small group of men.
(3) Of all the squads, 1st had perhaps the most difficult approach. Shortly after dismounting they became engaged with a handful of enemy soldiers among the Bocage on the North flank. At first the enemy were driven back with ease, but the excellent enemy use of their Spandaus slowed 1sts advance to a crawl. Without the armor support suppressing the suspected enemy positions, it is almost certain that 1st would not have made any further headway. The squad managed to get within attacking distance of their objective under the cover fire of our armor before the enemy in the field became far more aggressive. 1st was caught in a cross-fire from two enemy MGs and various small arms, firing from the Northern edge of "La Petit" and from among the various hedgerows. At risk of total destruction, the SL rather bravely ordered his squad to push the advance and disregard the enfilading fire. Needless to say they were devastated, but the rapid advance into La Petit allowed for a handful of survivors to enter the town and gain a foothold. They were speedily aided by 2nd Squad (moving mounted down the Verderie-Huegeville road) and swiftly cleared the objective in conjunction with them and under PHQ supervision.
(2) While trading fire with "La Petit", 2nd Squad reported small arms fire rattling off to the Platoon's rear. With both its sister squads already well on their way to their assigned objectives, it was quickly deduced that enemy infiltrators had managed to slip through to the Platoon's rear. The SL swiftly disengaged in their firefight with La Petit and split his squad into two elements; one to protect the Tank and its crew, the other to locate the exact enemy position. In any event, the enemy infiltrators were dealt with by the patrol with no losses being sustained. The enemy infiltrators were certainly more than a nuisance-effect, each man being armed with a panzerfaust and hand-held anti-tank weapon. If it had not been for the swift response from 2nd and the excellent situational awareness of 3rd (who helped 2nd zero in on the enemy audio), we could have suffered a devastating reverse from a small group of men.
(3) Of all the squads, 1st had perhaps the most difficult approach. Shortly after dismounting they became engaged with a handful of enemy soldiers among the Bocage on the North flank. At first the enemy were driven back with ease, but the excellent enemy use of their Spandaus slowed 1sts advance to a crawl. Without the armor support suppressing the suspected enemy positions, it is almost certain that 1st would not have made any further headway. The squad managed to get within attacking distance of their objective under the cover fire of our armor before the enemy in the field became far more aggressive. 1st was caught in a cross-fire from two enemy MGs and various small arms, firing from the Northern edge of "La Petit" and from among the various hedgerows. At risk of total destruction, the SL rather bravely ordered his squad to push the advance and disregard the enfilading fire. Needless to say they were devastated, but the rapid advance into La Petit allowed for a handful of survivors to enter the town and gain a foothold. They were speedily aided by 2nd Squad (moving mounted down the Verderie-Huegeville road) and swiftly cleared the objective in conjunction with them and under PHQ supervision.
The destruction of 1st squad could have been a disaster had the enemy not had to focus such firepower on them; weakening their cover of the main road. Between the embattled 3rd squad and the pinned 1st, the enemy could not bring sufficient fire power to bear to stop 2nd from simply entering the village under cover fire from our Armored support. Such improvisation is only possible due to the communications from First as to the nature of the enemy fire they received. When it became obvious to all that the pinned 1st squad had the majority of the enemy force to their front, it was acted upon swiftly. Regardless, the Northern approach route was clearly flawed, and shows a lack of situational awareness at the Platoon-level. The Platoon Commander is encouraged to move up with the rifle squads to reconnoiter the axis-of-attack personally in future operations.
The remaining enemy, upon the capture of La Petit, fell back under pressure from 3rd Squad to La Grand. They were swiftly cleared out in conjunction with the still-fresh 2nd Squad and the Platoon's Armored support. The last enemy pockets of resistance had to be eliminated by point-blank fire from the M4A1 Sherman. The mop-up of La Grand led to light losses in both squads.
For the cost of 2 wounded, and 7 killed, the Platoon seized its objectives and completely destroyed the enemy forces; forcing open the Verderie-Huegueville road.
Signed,
2nd Lieutenant Victor Rinaldi
C Troop, 113th Cav Sqdrn, 113th Cavalry Group
XIX Corps